Comment

Comment by David Ben-Abraham on August 19, 2008 at 1:18pm

My dear friend, Tsvi Rogin,

I saw your note and would like only to say that, while quoting from other sources, we can only be as accurate as the sources from which we quote.

From Epiphanius' book, "Treatise on Weights and Measures," pp. 28-35, of which only the Syriac translation survives, we find the following record of the succession of Caesars and their years of reign. If I have erred in this, it is only because of the ancient record that I made use of. But as you can see, there has been no mistake. Your count may have referred to Caesars who ruled jointly with other Caesars. Quoting from that source:

Augustus = 56 yrs. 6 mo.
Tiberius = 23 yrs.
Gaius (Caius) = 3 yrs. 9 mo. 29 days
Claudius = 13 yrs. 1 mo. 28 days
Nero = 13 yrs. 7 mo. 27 days
Galba = 7 mo. 26 days
Otho = 3 mo. 5 days
Vitellius = 8 mo. 12 days
Vespasian = 9 yrs. 7 mo. 12 days (During the 2nd yr. of his reign, the temple in Jerusalem was destroyed. This year corresponds to 68 C.E.)
Titus = 2 yrs. 2 mo. 2 days
Domitian = 15 yrs. 5 mo.
Nerva = 1 yr. 4 mo.
Trajan = 19 yrs.
Hadrian = 21 yrs.
Antoninus, surnamed Pius (the devout) = 22 yrs.
Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, otherwise called Verus (He is also called Commodus Lucius) = 19 yrs. (18 yrs)
Commodus II = 13 yrs.
Pertinax (Pertinas) = 6 mo.
Severus (who jointly reigned with his son Antoninus, otherwise called Caracalla who is also Geta). Severus was also known by the name Marcus Aurelius Verus = 18 yrs.
Caracalla (Geta), who is Antoninus the son of Severus (He ruled jointly with Lucius Aurelius Commodus) = 7 yrs.

The list, of course, goes on, with Macrinus ruling for only 1 yr. after Caracalla (who is also called Antoninus), and after Macrinus the governance of the kingdom passed on to Antoninus II who ruled for only 4 yrs. However, as you can see, Antoninus the son of Severus (friend of Rebbe Yehudah Hanassi) was the 5th line of Caesar – howbeit jointly – from Antoninus Pius.

Sincerely,
David

Comment by Tsvi Rogin on August 17, 2008 at 10:23pm

You said:
Actually, the Antoninus who was contemporary with Rebbe is NOT Antoninus Pius at all, but rather the fifth line of Caesar after him, viz., Antoninus who is called Caracalla & Geta, the son of Severus. (cf. Avodah Zarah 10b). He died approximately in anno 192 C.E., or in 503 of the Seleucid Era, according to Epiphanius' chronology of the Caesars found in his book, "Treatise on Weights and Measures." (Published by the Chicago University Press). It should be noted here that according to Seder HaKabbalah LaRavad, Rebbe compiled the Mishnah in the year 500 of the Seleucid Era, a year corresponding with 189 C.E.

The fifth after him was actually Didius Julianus. . Caracalla was two empreors later. He was emperor from 211-217, when Rebbi was 76 plus years old if still alive. Geta was Caracalla's brother, not another name for him. Antoninus Pius was probably emperor too soon to be the the friend of Rebbi. He was emperor from 138-161 when Rebbi was from ages 3-26.

The major candidates for Antoninus of Rebbi are Marcus Aurelius and Septimus Severus.

Comment by David Ben-Abraham on February 4, 2008 at 9:26am

Rebbe Josh, Our comments to your statements will follow at the end of this post.
(Sanhedrin 3b – 4b) - CONTINUED -

PART II
Rabbi Shimon, as it is written in the Boraitta: "[The Rabbis would say]: 'Two [erected sides are the minimum requirement], according to halacha, [in one's Sukkah], while the third [side is sufficient that it be] even a handbreadth [in width].' (Meaning, it is not necessary that the third wall built into one's Sukkah project outwards far enough so as to enclose the main part of a man's head and body, but rather it is only necessary that it extend outwards at least one-handbreadth in distance. Moreover, it is not necessary that that same wall touch one of the two other larger erected walls, but can be distanced from one of them within the space of three handbreadths in order for it to be reckoned as joined with the others – making up a total of three walls.) Rabbi Shimon says: 'Three [erected sides are the minimum requirement], according to halacha, while the fourth [side is sufficient that it be] even a handbreadth [in width].' "

The Gemara proceeds to explain the differences between the two:

"What are they divided over? The Rabbis hold the view that the traditional Scripture text is authoritative in biblical interpretation. [Hebrew: Yesh em lemesoreth.] (Meaning, since the Hebrew characters in the Torah are written without phonetics, one is able to assign to the text any vocalization that he chooses if it serves his purpose in a particular exegesis.) But Rabbi Shimon holds the view that the tradition of reading (i.e. orthography and the letters with their traditional vowel symbols received orally at Sinai) is authoritative in biblical interpretation. [Hebrew: Yesh em lemiqra.] (Meaning, you must not, in this particular instance, stretch the meaning of the text by reading into the word other phonetics not traditionally associated with that word.)
The Rabbis hold [to the principle] 'Yesh em lemesoreth' – [namely, in Leviticus 23: 42-43], בַּסֻּכַּת (singular), בַּסֻּכַּת (singular) and בַּסֻּכּוֹת (plural), which make for a total of four [erected sides]. Take away one verse seeing that it is needed for its own sake [and is not superfluous], you are then left with [only] three. (Meaning, since the other words are mainly redundant, they are given over to exegesis. Hence: three sides.) An oral teaching delivered by Moses at Sinai then comes along and you diminish [the width of] the third side, letting it stand at only a handbreadth.

Now Rabbi Shimon holds [to the principle] 'Yesh em lemiqra' (ibid.), [namely], בַּסֻּכֹּת (plural), בַּסֻּכֹּת (plural) andבַּסֻּכּוֹת (plural), which when taken together amount to a total of six [sides]. Take away one verse seeing that it is needed for its own sake [and is not superfluous], you are then left with four [sides]. An oral teaching delivered by Moses at Sinai then comes along and you diminish [the width of] the fourth side, letting it stand at only a handbreadth."

Rabbi Akiva says: "From whence do we know that a quarter-log of blood which issues forth from two dead persons would cause defilement within a tent-like enclosure? As it says (Lev. 21:11): 'He (i.e. the high priest) is not to come upon any souls of the dead;' [Meaning], two souls having the [combined] quantity [of blood] equivalent to that of one [dead man]."

NOTE: Here, in our verse, 'the dead' מֵת is written in the singular, while the word 'souls' נַפְשֹׁת is written in the plural. Rabbi Akiva interprets the word 'souls' as 'blood,' or two pools of blood, just as we find in the Torah (Deut. 12:23): 'Ki hadam hu hanefesh' –'For the blood is the soul.' Meaning, although no single slain corpse had the quantity of blood needed to make-up defilement, but when combined together they make-up the designated quantity of one quarter log of blood, this suffices to render defilement to that house or to any tent-like enclosure wherein that blood lay.)

The Gemara goes on to say:
"And the Rabbis read [there] "nafeshath" נַפְשַׁת [in the singular]."

This entire statement made by Rabbi Yitzhaq, the son of Yose, who in turn quoted from Rabbi Yochanan, saying that only the forenamed Rabbis hold to the principle of "Yesh em lemiqra," prompted a strong censure from Rav Acha bar Yaakov. The Gemara proceeds from there to say:

"Rav Acha bar Yaakov objected strongly to that [entire statement], saying: 'Is there anyone who doesn't accept the principle of Yesh em lemiqra?' " (A rhetorical question, meaning, of course there isn't anyone who denies this principle of logic. Everyone accepts it.)

Rav Acha bar Yaakov goes on to prove his point, saying:

"But, behold, it's written in a Boraitta: '[The scripture says] (Exo. 23:19): [You shall not seethe the kid of a goat] in its mother's milk ((בַּחַלֵב אִמֹּו. Perhaps you are to say there: [You shall not seethe the kid of a goat] in its mother's tallow? בַּחֵלֶב)) [No]! The tradition of reading as being authoritative in biblical interpretation [is what holds up here].' [Learn from it], rather, that everyone holds to the principle of Yesh em lemiqra!"

Having established the fact that all Rabbis hold to the principle of "Yesh em lemiqra," looking back now in retrospect, we are still left, as it were, without a sufficient explanation as to why the Rabbis in Tosefta Sanhedrin 1:1 require only three judges in monetary cases. Note that we say, "as it were," since both principles of logic – "Yesh em lemiqra" and "Yesh em lemesoreth" – are still equally employed in biblical exegeses. Rav Acha bar Yaakov, however, tries explaining the Rabbis' position in Exo. 22:8 without having to use the principle of "Yesh em lemesoreth," saying:

"Now Rebbe and the Rabbis are, rather, divided over this. (That is to say, in their interpretation of the word 'yarshee'oun' ירשיען in Exodus 22:8.) Rebbe holds the view that 'yarshee'oun elohim' [mentioned in the last clause] is actually a different set [of judges]. The Rabbis, [on the other hand], regard '(yarshee'oun) [elohim]' in both places [as the same set of judges]. Now as for Rabbi Yehudah the son of Ro'etz, the Rabbis do not dispute with him. (Meaning, the Rabbis will agree with Rabbi Yehudah, the son of Ro'etz, that the tradition of reading shevu'ayim שְׁבֻעַיִם (two weeks) is the proper way of reading the verse in Leviticus 12:5.)"

Continuing along this train of thought, Rav Acha now seeks to prove that the school of Hillel, likewise, follows a tradition of "Yesh em lemiqra," unlike that which was previously stated about the school of Hillel when expounding on the words "qarnoth" in Leviticus chapter 4:

"The school of Hillel, as it is written in the Boraitta: 'And he shall make atonement וְכִפֶּר; and he shall make atonement וְכִפֶּר; and he shall make atonement וְכִפֶּר (Lev. 4: vss. 26, 31 & 35)- [each word being required] from the standpoint of the law. (Meaning, the school of Hillel do not change here the reading of the text, seeing that each word is needed to show how that a single application of blood would be sufficient to affect atonement.)

The Gemara (or Rav Acha) raises a series of objections:

"Now can we not derive [the same teaching] by way of deductive logic? It says 'blood' (Heb. damim) [in the text] below, and it says 'blood' (Heb. damim) [in the text] above. Just as the word 'blood' spoken of [in the text] below [and] which was put as one, single oblation makes atonement, so, too, the word 'blood' spoken of [in the text] above [and] which was put as one, single oblation makes atonement." (Meaning, in the succeeding verses of Leviticus chapter 5 which speak about the Sin-offerings made of fowl. Just as sprinkling the blood of fowls on the wall of the altar is sufficient when administered only once, so, too, the blood of four-footed domesticated animals would be sufficient had it been administered only once. So explains RASHI. That is to say, if the same can be learned by way of this prototype, why, then, would the school of Hillel stand in need of each word in the text?)

The Gemara (or Rav Acha) continues by trying to establish the notion that perhaps blood taken from animals designated as Sin-offerings must still be placed on all four horns of the altar:

"Or else you can have it [stated] in this way. It says 'blood' [with regard to that altar] without, and it says blood [with regard to the curtain] within. Just as the word 'blood' spoken of within, had it lacked one of its oblations, he has done nothing, so, too, the word 'blood' spoken of without, had it lacked one of its oblations, he has done nothing. Let us see which is similar. They infer [a certain thing] about that which lies without from [another thing] which lies without, but they do not infer [a certain thing] about that which lies without from [another thing] which lies within. (Meaning, since the altar lying directly outside of the Temple sanctuary was used for Sin-offerings brought from domesticated animals and for Sin-offerings brought from fowl, it is fitting to compare one to the other. However, comparing the altar to the curtain is not fitting.)

Or else you can have it [stated] in this way. They infer [a certain thing] about the Sin-offering and the four horns [of the altar] from [another thing] which concerns the Sin-offering and the four horns [of the altar], but let no man prove [a thing from] this, where there is no Sin-offering nor four horns [of an altar]. (Meaning, the above comparisons between the altar and the curtain are unequal comparisons, and one would do better to compare the application of blood upon the altar with another thing that requires blood placed on the altar.) Accustom yourself to saying, [therefore], 'And he shall make atonement וְכִפֶּר; and he shall make atonement וְכִפֶּר; and he shall make atonement וְכִפֶּר (Lev. 4: vss. 26, 31 & 35)- [each word being required] from the standpoint of the law. He has made atonement although he did not put but three [blood oblations upon the three horns of the altar]; he has made atonement although he did not put but two [blood oblations upon the two horns of the altar]; he has made atonement although he did not put but one [blood oblation upon one horn of the altar].

Rabbi Shimon is of the opinion that creating a covered booth does not require any [special] tradition of reading. The Rabbis, [on the other hand], are of the opinion that creating a covered booth requires a [special] tradition of reading.

But Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis are divided, rather, over this. Rabbi Akiva holds the view that 'nafeshoth' נַפְשֹׁת has the meaning of two people's [blood], while the Rabbis hold the view that 'nafeshoth' was stated in its usual way. (That is to say, although it is to be read in the plural, it still refers to the blood of a single individual.) And all of them hold to the principle that the tradition of reading (i.e. orthography and the letters with their traditional vowel symbols) is authoritative in biblical interpretation."

Until here the Gemara tries to support the words of Rav Acha who said that the forenamed Rabbis hold strictly to the principle of "Yesh em lemiqra," to the exclusion of the other principle, "Yesh em lemesoreth." However, this hypothesis is soon rejected:

"But, lo, it is written in a Boraitta: 'Letotafath לְטֹטָפַת (i.e. Deut. 6:8, to be read in the singular); letotafath לְטֹוטָפַת (i.e. Exo. 13:16, to be read in the singular); letotafoth לְטוֹטָפֹת (i.e. Deut. 11:18, to be read in the plural). Behold! Here you have four [compartments built into one's head phylactery]. So are the words of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: It is not necessary [to explain it that way]. [For] tat in the dialect of Kitfei means two. (Meaning, the Hebrew letters טט in the word לטטפת would still mean "two" by way of an exegesis on that word.) [And] fath in the North African dialect [also] means two.' Rather, [you should say] that they are always divided [about the issue of whether there is 'Yesh em lemiqra' and 'Yesh em lemesoreth.'] And what we have said [here] about their being divided is where we find two verses that can be expounded [one way] by the principle 'yesh em lemesoreth,' [and the other verse by the principle 'yesh em lemiqra.'] (Meaning, wherever we find a word written two different ways, as in לטטפת and in לטוטפת, some of our Rabbis hold the principle of "Yesh em lemesoreth.") But that [word] 'chalav' (Exo. 22:19), [and which appears again as] 'chalav' (Deut. 14:21), seeing that they appear together [written in the very same way], we say, in this case, 'Yesh em lemiqra'." (Hebrew: חָלָב = milk, which when it is written as a conjunction of two words is always written asחַלֵב אִמּוֹ).

This, too, is rejected by the Gemara, as we shall show:

"But, behold! [The word], 'Yero'eh' יֵרָאֶה (Exo. 23:17), [meaning, 'shall appear,'] is written elsewhere as 'Yero'eh' יֵרָאֶה (Deut. 16:16), both words appearing together [in the Torah, written in the very same way], and yet are they divided [over its interpretation]! As it is written in the Boraitta: Yochanan, the son of Dehabai, says in the name of Rabbi Yehudah, the son of Teima: He that is blind in one of his eyes is exempt from making the appearance [before the Lo-rd in Jerusalem, with an offering], as it is written 'Yero'eh, yir'eh' יֵרָאֶה יִרְאֶה. [Meaning], as is the manner in which he comes to see, so is the manner in which he comes to appear [before the Lo-rd in Jerusalem, with an offering]. Just as when [he comes] to see requires [the ability of sight] by using two of his eyes, so, too, when he makes an appearance [before the Lo-rd in Jerusalem, with an offering], it requires [the ability of sight] by using two of his eyes!"

- SO FAR THE GEMARA –

* * * * * * * * *

Rebbe Josh,

Here, then, is our greatest proof - that while a word may be written in one, uniform way, its phonetics can still be changed when expounding on the meaning of that one word – as in יראה. It is the same with the word יצא and with דבר פשע. We find yet another example of this form of exegesis: That word in Deuteronomy 31:12, namely, יִלְמְדוּ , is explained in the Jerusalem Talmud (Hagigga 1:1) as having a dual meaning of יִלְמְדוּ ("so that they will learn") and יְלַמְּדוּ ("so that they will teach"), by way of changing its traditional vocalization for something else in order to show that a deaf-mute is exempt from appearing at the feast. We find a similar teaching in the Babylonian Talmud (Kiddushin 29b): And to teach him Torah. Whence do we know this? As it is written: "And you shall teach them to your sons." (Deut. 11:19). Yet, when his father does not teach him, he is obligated to teach himself, as it is written: "You shall learn." (i.e. By way of changing the vowel symbols of the same word ולמדתם, so that it now reads, "learn.") Whence do we know that she is not obligated [to teach her son]? As it is written: "And you shall teach;" [Which can also be read], "And you shall learn." All those who are commanded to learn are commanded to teach. And all those who are not commanded to learn, are not commanded to teach.

The Gemara in Sanhedrin 3b – 4b could not hold its own in claiming that all Rabbis hold only to the view of "Yesh em lemiqra," to the exclusion of "Yesh em lemesoreth," as proven by this very last argument with the word יראה. The conclusion here is that there are those who still make use of the principle "Yesh em lemesoreth." But to say that this principle is disputed between the Rabbis is not rendering due justice to our Gemara. Rather, in those specific instances referred to by the Gemara, this principle is accepted by some and rejected by others. The principle itself, however, is accepted by all as a valid way of teaching. This is further attested to by the Gemara in Sukkah 6b which says there that you can either say that ALL Rabbis hold to the view of "Yesh em lemiqra," or that ALL Rabbis hold to the view of "Yesh em lemesoreth."

Although your objections to our earlier posts have induced this response, we have tried to show here that the Gemara is intermixed with sundry variables, some of which may be in keeping with halacha, and others which obviously are not. For it is the way of the Babylonian Talmud to sometimes object to a well-established rule or opinion by bringing down an argument which is not always in keeping with halacha. And as your own eyes have seen, the Gemara teeter-totters back and forth between "Yesh em lemiqra" and "Yesh em lemesoreth."

Your own broad knowledge of the Talmud and its mannerisms precludes a formal introduction into these underlying principles. They are well-known to those long occupied in the study of our Talmud. So, here then is our post. It is part and parcel of the whole. If you should continue to have any questions about the same, we shall gladly answer them according to our ability. Yet, meanwhile, we cut short our treatise so as not to be cumbersome upon our readers.

Sincerely,
David

The Source:

ר"ש דתניא שתים כהלכתן ושלישית אפילו טפח. ר"ש אומר שלש כהלכתן ורביעית אפילו טפח. במאי קמיפלגי. רבנן סברי יש אם למסורת ור"ש סבר יש אם למקרא. רבנן סברי יש אם למסורת בסכת בסכת בסוכות הרי כאן ארבע. דל חד קרא לגופיה פשו להו תלת. אתאי הלכתא גרעתא לשלישית ואוקימתא אטפח.
ור"ש סבר בסוכות בסוכות בסוכות הרי כאן שש. דל חד קרא לגופיה פשו להו ארבע. אתאי הלכתא גרעתא לרביעית ואוקמיה אטפח.

ר"ע דתניא ר"ע אומר מניין לרביעית דם שיצאה משני מתים שמטמא באהל שנאמר על כל נפשות מת לא יבא. שתי נפשות ושיעור א'. ורבנן נפשת כתיב.

מתקיף לה רב אחא בר יעקב מי איכא דלית לי' יש אם למקרא. והתניא בַּחַלֵב אמו. יכול בַּחֵלֶב אמרת. יש אם למקרא. אלא דכ"ע יש אם למקרא, ורבי ורבנן בהא קמיפלגי. רבי סבר ירשיעון אלהים אחריני ורבנן סברי ירשיעון דהאיך והאי.
ור"י בן רועץ לא פליגי רבנן עליה.

ב"ה דתניא וכפר וכפר וכפר מפני הדין. והלא דין הוא. נאמר דמים למטה ונאמר דמים למעלה. מה דמים האמורים למטה שנתנן במתנה אחת כיפר, אף דמים האמורים למעלה שנתנן במתנה אחת כיפר.

או כלך לדרך זו נאמר דמים בחוץ ונאמר דמים בפנים. מה דמים האמורים בפנים חיסר אחת ממתנות לא עשה ולא כלום, אף דמים האמורים בחוץ חיסר אחת ממתנות לא עשה ולא כלום. נראה למי דומה דנין חוץ מחוץ ואין דנין חוץ מפנים.
או כלך לדרך זו דנין חטאת וד' קרנות מחטאת וארבע קרנות ואל יוכיח זה שאין חטאת וד' קרנות. תלמוד לומר וכפר וכפר וכפר מפני הדין. כיפר אע"פ שלא נתן אלא שלשה. כיפר אף על פי שלא נתן אלא שתים. כיפר אע"פ שלא נתן אלא אחת.

ור"ש ורבנן בהא פליגי. ר"ש סבר סככא לא בעי קרא, ורבנן סברי סככא בעי קרא.

ור"ע ורבנן בהא פליגי. ר"ע סבר נפשות תרתי משמע, ורבנן סברי נפשות דעלמא משמע, ודכולי עלמא יש אם למקרא.

והתניא לטטפת לטטפת לטוטפות. הרי כאן ארבע. דברי ר' ישמעאל. ר"ע אומר אינו צריך טט בכתפי שתים. פת באפריקי שתים. אלא לעולם פליגי, והני מילי כי פליגי היכא דשני קרא ממסורת, אבל האי חלב חלב דכי הדדי נינהו יש אם למקרא.
והרי יראה יראה דכי הדדי נינהו ופליגי דתניא, יוחנן בן דהבאי אומר משום רבי יהודה בן תימא, הסומא בא' מעיניו פטור מן הראיה שנ' יראה יראה. כדרך שבא לראות כך בא ליראות. מה לראות בשתי עיניו אף ליראות בשתי עיניו...

Comment by Rabbi Joshua Waxman on February 4, 2008 at 9:22am

I'll try to take a look at it over the next few days.

By the way, based on the hit counter I put above, it looks like it is only me and you on this thread. I saw one hit for myself, and one for another person, who I assume was you. There was also someone who followed a link (I think from page 3) to a post at my blog about Shadal's vikuach, but that person might have come off a Google search. (There *might* be people following along by email. I doubt it, but if so, feel free to alert us to your presence.) So my best guess is that there are no readers.

My guess is that the specific arcane topic, of middot shehaTorah nidreshet bahen, is unlikely to attract interest. Add to that the length of the thread as well as perhaps the assumption that either one side or the other is obviously correct, and this is understandable, I think.

As such, it may or may not be worthwhile to take the time to hash this out.

Kol Tuv,
Josh

Comment by David Ben-Abraham on February 4, 2008 at 8:53am

Rebbe Josh, Shalom.

I was hoping that it wouldn't come to this, but now that it has, this rejoinder will admit of no small pretenses, or misconstruing of the facts. I do not mean by you, of course, since I have no doubt as to your ability to grasp these things, but rather by our beloved readers who may have been confused by our recent exchanges on this thread. Our response to some of your comments will come at the end of this treatise. I am also pasting the Gemara (Hebrew) at the end of this treatise.(This post has been re-edited.)

PART I

If we were to paraphrase the entire section in the Talmud (Sanhedrin 3b-4b), we would find the following disquisition:

The Rabbis taught: (Tosefta Sanhedrin 1:1) "Court cases involving monetary matters are settled in a court of three judges. Rebbe says in a court of five judges, so that a verdict might be reached by [a majority of] three."

To which last statement an explanation was demanded by those studying this Boraitta:
"Had there only been three, is a verdict not also reached by [a majority of] two?!"

This difficulty was later addressed by the scholars, saying that his words can be explained in the following way, viz.,
"Its meaning is thus. Seeing that the rendering of any judgment is [ordinarily made] by three judges, it is for this reason that he (Rebbe) holds the opinion that when the Torah writes about [the necessity of having] three judges, the sense is that the verdict be reached by three judges."

At which explanation a strong rebuttal was issued, prompting the Gemara to write:

Rabbi Abhu would cast affronts at that explanation, saying: "If that were the case, we would also need the Greater Sanhedrin to be comprised of one-hundred and forty-one judges in order that the verdict be reached by seventy-one judges!" (Meaning, since a Great Sanhedrin is only made-up of seventy-one judges and no more, we can conclude thereby that even in ordinary courts of law they require no more than three judges to be the arbitrators in all cases brought before them.) "Moreover," says Rabbi Abhu, "we would also need the Lesser Sanhedrin to be comprised of forty-five judges in order that the verdict be reached by twenty-three judges! Rather, G-d has said (Numbers 11:16): 'Gather unto me seventy men,' [that is], from the time of their gathering there ought to be seventy [men]. [The Scripture also says] (Numbers 35:24-25): 'the congregation shall then judge, &c. and the congregation shall deliver,' – likewise, the requisite here is from the very hour of arbitration! (Meaning, a congregation of ten to judge, and a congregation of ten to deliver, and three to make them unequal in number.) In the same way we find the Scripture (Exodus 22: 7), 'then the master of the house shall be brought unto the judges' (Heb. elohim), [that is], from the time the litigant approaches, there should be in place a panel of three [judges]!"

Note: Rabbi Abhu's clever way of countering the scholars' remark leaves Rebbe's teaching (which required five judges) without a clear explanation. He went on, therefore, to explain Rebbe's position in the following way:

"Rather, this is Rebbe's reason [for requiring five judges]. [The Scripture says] (Exodus 22:8): 'He whom the judges shall find guilty, etc.' (The words, "shall find guilty," are expressed by the Hebrew in one singular word, Viz., "Yarshee'oun," yet, this word is written out in the Hebrew as a defective verb lacking the letter "vav," ירשיען , but which was still given the equivalent vowel symbol of "u," or what is known in Hebrew as "qubbutz," beneath the letter "Ayin," so that the verb remains in the plural form יַרְשִׁיעֻן .) Here we learn of the necessity of there being at least two judges. (Meaning, since the verb has come down unto us in the plural form.) Now below [that passage of Scripture] it says 'elohim' (i.e. the Hebrew word for "judge/s," which we have already established is at least two), and above [that passage of Scripture] it says 'elohim.' Just as the word [written] below means two, so does that word above mean two, but since a court cannot be equal in number, they add thereto another member, hence: five judges!"

At this point, Rabbi Abhu also seeks to explain the Rabbis' position in the above Tosefta (Sanhedrin 1:1) where they only require three judges. For they take the same verse and read into it a singular verb, and not a plural verb.

"But the Rabbis have it written [there as] 'Yarshee'an.' "
(Meaning, since the word ירשיען is written out in the Hebrew as a defective verb lacking the letter "vav," and which letter would have otherwise made the verb plural, the Rabbis, therefore, had it as a tradition to read the word as "Yarshee'an," יַרְשִׁיעַן, in the singular. In this case, the noun "elohim" which precedes the verb, and once again is written after the verb, is to be understood as meaning one single judge in each case.)

Continuing along this train of thought, the Gemara says:

Rabbi Yitzhaq, the son of Rabbi Yose, said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: "Rebbe and Rabbi Yehudah the son of Ro'etz and the school of Shammai, along with Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Akiva – all of them hold the opinion that the tradition of reading (i.e. orthography and the letters with their vowel symbols) is authoritative in biblical interpretation."

(Meaning, in very specific instances throughout the Scriptures they would hold this principle of logic, as we shall shortly prove.)

The Gemara proceeds to explain:

Rebbe, lo, it is as we have already stated, (i.e. in Exodus 22:8, "Yarshee'oun," to be read in the plural form), and Rabbi Yehudah, the son of Ro'etz, as it is written in a Boraitta (Sifra): "[Certain] disciples asked Rabbi Yehudah, the son of Ro'etz: 'Shall I read, shiv'im (i.e. "seventy," by a play on the wordשבעים in Leviticus 12: 5)? Is it possible that she who gives birth to a female remains unclean seventy [days]?' He said to them: 'He has rendered, both, uncleanness and cleanness with a male child, and has rendered, both, uncleanness and cleanness with a female child. Just as when he rendered cleanness with a male child, with a female child the time-frame is double, so, too, when he rendered uncleanness with a male child, with a female the time-frame would be double.' After they had gone out, he went out and followed after them. He [then] said to them: 'You do not stand in need of that [rationalization]. [Afterall], we read shevu'ayim שְׁבֻעַיִם (meaning, "two weeks"), and the tradition of reading (i.e. orthography and the letters with their vowel symbols) is authoritative in biblical interpretation.' "

The school of Shammai, as it is written in the Mishnah (Zevahim 4:1): "The school of Shammai say: 'Any [offering] whose blood is put upon the outer altar, [and] which was given as a single oblation, makes atonement, but with the Sin-offering (Heb. hatath) it requires [at least] two oblations.' And the school of Hillel say: 'Even with the Sin-offering which was given as a single oblation, it [still] makes atonement.' "
Now Rav Huna has asked, what is the reason for the school of Shammai? (Meaning, why do they require at least two oblations for the Sin-offering, when the school of Hillel only require one oblation whenever the officiating priest could not bring all four?)

Rav Huna proceeds to answer his own question:
It is because they read thrice in the Scriptures (Leviticus ch. 4: vss. 18, 30 & 34), "qarnoth" (i.e. horns [of the altar]) קַרְנֹת, "qarnoth" קַרְנֹת, [and once again] "qarnoth" קַרְנֹת, which when taken together amount to six – four [blood oblations are to be put on the four corners of the altar] as a first rule, but only two [blood oblations] being actually indispensable. (Meaning, since the school of Shammai will recognize here "Yesh em lemiqra," and that each noun is written in the plural, literally meaning two horns, we find a total of six horns as it were mentioned in these verses. But since there are really only four horns on the altar, each requiring its own blood oblation, the other two are left for an exegesis, namely, only two horns are indispensable.)

Having explained the school of Shammai, Rav Huna proceeds to explain the school of Hillel:
Now the school of Hillel say (Leviticus ch. 4: vss. 7, 18 & 25) "qarnoth" קַרְנֹות, "qarnath" קַרְנַת, [and once again] "qarnath" קַרְנַת, which when taken together amount to four – three (should be: "four") [blood oblations are to be put on the four corners of the altar] as a first rule, but only one [blood oblation] being actually indispensable. (Meaning, the school of Hillel will recognize here "Yesh em lemesoreth," and will therefore read into the noun קרנת a very different order of vocalization, making two of the words appear in the singular, while one appears in the plural.)

Now [if you were to] say that all of them (i.e. the blood oblations) are to be put [upon the altar] as a first rule, we have not found such a thing as ineffective atonement.

-SO FAR THE GEMARA -

* * * * * * * *

PLEASE NOTE that where you refuted our position in an earlier post when we said the school of Shammai holds the teaching of "yesh em lemesoreth" by regarding the word devar (in Exo. 22:8) as dibbur, and you said that this cannot possibly be true since we see the gemara in Sanhedrin which cited the statement from Rabbi Yochanan that Bet Shammai holds "yesh em lamiqra." Again, there, it is only a specific reference, and does not hold true for all other Scriptural verses. There is, therefore, no contradiction between the gemara in Sanhedrin and that in Baba Metzia. The school of Shammai and the school of Hillel are still seen here as consistent, especially in lieu of the fact that our Rabbis have always enumerated these two principles of logic, "yesh em lemiqra veyesh em lemesoreth," as being principles that are both de facto and accepted by all as true.

Moreover, if the school of Hillel changed the traditional order of vocalization in the verses Lev. 4: 18 & 25, as we have seen above, what would prevent the school of Shammai from doing the same when it serves their purpose in a particular exegesis, such as in the teaching of Baba Metzia 43b – 44a? Here, even when the gemara fails to state explicitly what manner of exegesis it is, we still recognize it.

Also, where you wrote: "So to sum up, never was the gemara suggesting that 'yesh em lamikra veyesh em lamasoret.' Rather, within Rabbi Yochanan (and the straight reading of many other gemaras), this was a dispute, with some holding 'lamikra' to the exclusion of 'lamesoret,' etc. etc."
Rebbe Josh, we have evinced that these two principles are not in dispute by the Rabbis as you suggest, but rather each principle is applied where a certain derasha (exegesis) is needed – and this only to the exclusion of the other principle vis-à-vis that particular exegesis. Even you admit that the Rabbis who make use of the principle "Yesh em lemesoreth" for coming up with how many sides דפנות would be the minimum requirement according to halacha in one's Sukkah, they would still read the Torah on any given Sabbath day in accordance with the traditional reading known as "Yesh em lemiqra." Rabbi Sherira Gaon, likewise, has already made this point clear in his Iggeres (ch. 6), saying: "Even the earliest Sages possessed a Talmud…and even though they did not all recite the laws in a uniform version or wording, nevertheless it is known that the underlying principles [of the laws] are one and the same, and all [the various ways of expressing them] are equivalent…. Their principles [included]: inference from minor to major, numerical computations of letters, and various methods of exegesis. Among them were the thirteen hermeneutical principles used by R. Yishmael [to expound the Torah], and other methods, such as…a) explaining the juxtapositions [of two verses or sections in the Torah], and b) correlative ideas, and c) one does not learn from two Scriptures when the end result comes to serve the very same function… and d) if you seize much, you cannot hold it; if you seize little, you can hold it… and e) the tradition of reading is authoritative in biblical interpretation, whilst the traditional Scripture text is also authoritative in biblical interpretation." Note how he brings down both principles of logic in a single category, as implying that both principles are equally valid.

Finally, you wrote: "If you continue reading on Sanhedrin 4b, you will see that every one of Rabbi Yochanan's 'yesh em lamikra/masoret' disputes is recast, to make it so that the dispute is no longer one of mikra vs. masoret. Rather, in every instance, it is 'yesh em lamikra' to the *EXCLUSION* of the masoret. No longer is revocalizing the point of any of the listed disputes. Of course, this gemara misses out on a couple of disputes and so does not recast them. But in every case listed, namely those of Rabbi Yochanan, it rereads the dispute as not being about revocalization at all."

Again, I must correct you here. It is plain to me and to all those who read our thread that Rabbi Yitzhaq's words were bound to be rejected in the end. It was inevitable. Afterall, remember what he said:
"Rabbi Yitzhaq, the son of Rabbi Yose, said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: 'Rebbe and Rabbi Yehudah the son of Ro'etz and the school of Shammai, along with Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Akiva – all of them hold the opinion that the tradition of reading (i.e. orthography and the letters with their vowel symbols) is authoritative in biblical interpretation.' "
By saying that only these Rabbis, and only these alone, hold to that principle "Yesh em lemiqra," it would imply in a broader sense that all other Rabbis do not hold to that principle. This, of course, is not true. The principle, "Yesh em lemiqra," is actually accepted by all. Therefore, following this new train of thought, the gemara brings down other examples in an effort to prove that all Rabbis hold to the principle that the tradition of reading is authoritative in biblical interpretation. This is the way of the Babylonian Talmud, to reject a thing, and to sometimes even counter attack an established rule or opinion although that attack might not always be in line with halacha.

Sincerely,
David

THE SOURCE:

סנהדרין דף ג' עמ' ב' – ד' עמ' ב'

תנו רבנן: "דיני ממונות בשלשה. רבי אומר בחמשה כדי שיגמר הדין בשלשה."
אטו בתלתא, מי לא גמר דינא בתרי!?
הכי קאמר, מפני שגמר דין בשלשה אלמא קסבר תלתא כי כתיבי, בגמר דינא כתיבי.
מגדף בה רבי אבהו: "אלא מעתה תהא סנהדרי גדולה צריכה מאה וארבעים ואחד כדי שיגמר הדין בשבעים ואחד, ותהא סנהדרי קטנה צריכה ארבעים וחמשה כדי שיגמר הדין בשלשה ועשרים. אלא אספה לי שבעים איש אמר רחמנא, משעת אסיפה שבעים. ושפטו העדה והצילו העדה נמי משעת שפיטת העדה. הכי נמי ונקרב בעל הבית אל האלהים, משעת קריבה שלשה. אלא היינו טעמא דרבי. אשר ירשעון אלהים, תרי. נאמר אלהים למטה ונאמר אלהים למעלה. מה למטה שנים אף למעלה שנים. ואין בית דין שקול, מוסיפין עליהם עוד אחד הרי כאן חמשה.

ורבנן ירשען כתיב. א"ר יצחק בר' יוסי, אמר ר' יוחנן: רבי ורבי יהודה בן רועץ ובית שמאי ור"ש ור' עקיבא כולהו סבירא להו יש אם למקרא.

רבי הא דאמרן, ור' יהודה בן רועץ דתניא שאלו תלמידים את ר' יהודה בן רועץ אקרא אני שבעים, יכול תהא יולדת נקבה טמאה שבעים. אמר להן טימא וטיהר בזכר וטימא וטיהר בנקבה. מה כשטיהר בזכר בנקבה כפלים, אף כשטימא בזכר בנקבה כפלים. לאחר שיצאו יצא ומחזיר אחריהם. אמר להן אי אתם זקוקים לכך, שבועיים קרינן ויש אם למקרא.

ב"ש דתנן ב"ש אומרים כל הניתנין על מזבח החיצון שנתנן במתנה אחת כיפר, ובחטאת שתי מתנות. ובית הלל אומרים אף בחטאת שנתנן במתנה אחת כיפר.
ואמר רב הונא מ"ט דב"ש. קרנות קרנות קרנות, הרי כאן שש. ארבע למצוה ושתים לעכב. ובית הלל אומרים קרנות קרנת קרנת הרי כאן ארבע, ג' למצוה ואחת לעכב.
ואימא כולהו למצוה. כפרה בכדי לא אשכחן.


-TO BE CONTINUED -

Comment by Rabbi Joshua Waxman on January 29, 2008 at 4:50pm

Shalom!

I'll wait until you finish this series before beginning my response, if I do so. I see that we are of like mind in terms of sticking to our guns, and this can be a tremendous time-draw.

I wonder if there are indeed others following this thread. I'll include some HTML code here to find out.




Kol Tuv,
Josh

Comment by Rabbi Joshua Waxman on January 28, 2008 at 1:41pm

I can see both possibilities as being argued for, but I believe that the traditional understanding (which I share) is that someone who holds "yesh em lamesoret" would require that the verses be read in accordance with their mikra, and would correct someone who read it in accordance with their revocalization.

And that the masoret vocalization is just on the level of deriving law via midrash halacha. Perhaps much as they would not require someone to read "kesef tachat ayin," and would correct someone who did so.

Kol Tuv,
Josh

Comment by David Ben-Abraham on January 27, 2008 at 6:10pm

Rebbe Josh,

If I might ask you but one question: Do the Rabbis in Sanhedrin 4a who expound on the verses in Leviticus 23: 43-44 (basukkath / basukkath / basukkoth) also hold the view that, when standing up to read from the Torah on the Sabbath day, these verses can be read in their traditional vocalization of "basukkoth," "basukkoth" and "basukkoth?"

David

Comment by Rabbi Joshua Waxman on January 27, 2008 at 2:23pm

Shalom.

I agree that Sanhedrin is teaching something *similar,* but not quite equivalent, to what you posit.

Where Rav Acha bar Yaakov asks on Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef's cited statement of Rabbi Yochanan, he is arguing on the principle, rather than modifying Rabbi Yochanan's statement.

At least this is the way the setama digmara understands his statement. If you continue reading on Sanhedrin 4b, you will see that every one of Rabbi Yochanan's "yesh em lamikra/masoret" disputes is recast, to make it so that the dispute is no longer one of mikra vs. masoret.

Rather, in every instance, it is "yesh em lamikra" to the *EXCLUSION* of the masoret. No longer is revocalizing the point of any of the listed disputes. Of course, this gemara misses out on a couple of disputes and so does not recast them. But in every case listed, namely those of Rabbi Yochanan, it rereads the dispute as not being about revocalization at all.

Thus, if you wished to say according to Rav Acha bar Yaakov, then it is not "yesh em lamikra veYesh em lamesoret," but rather only "yesh em lamikra," *only* the traditional reading is determinant, to the exclusion of any revocalization.

This is at odds with Rabbi Yochanan, and with the local peshat in several other gemaras. In all of those cases, "yesh em lamikra" held by some to the exclusion of "lamesoret," and "yesh em lamesoret" is held by some as determinant to the exclusion of "lamikra."

Even locally in Sanhedrin, Rav Acha bar Yaakov's position is rejected. For if you look towards the bottom of Sanhedrin 4b, you will see that Rav Acha son of Rav Ikka handily disproves Rav Acha bar Yaakov's prooftext. Rav Acha bar Yaakov notes that "lo tevashel gedi bachalev imo" on the level of mikra would refer to milk, but on the level of masoret would refer to fat. Rav Acha son of Rav Ikka explains that based on "lo tevashel," the Torah was clearly speaking about seething, which is done in a liquid. Therefore, the possible masoret-based revocalization was not available for this verse, and so would have to read it according to the only available vocalization, the mikra, which would mean milk. Therefore, even though they would argue in every other verse, they would not argue here.

This is somewhat akin to for example Rabbi Yehuda ben Roetz who first worked within a framework of the acceptability of "yesh em lamesoret" and then showed that the only shevuayim made sense as a vocalization within context. But then, holding that "yesh em lamikra," such an appeal to context was unnecessary.

So to sum up, never was the gemara suggesting that "yesh em lamikra veyesh em lamasoret." Rather, within Rabbi Yochanan (and the straight reading of many other gemaras), this was a dispute, with some holding "lamikra" to the exclusion of "lamesoret," and some held "lamesoret" to the exclusion of "lamikra." According to Rav Acha bar Yaakov, everyone holds "yesh em lamikra" to the exclusion of "lamesoret," and so nobody holds both. And with Rav Acha son of Rav Ikka's rejoinder, we return the understanding of these disputes to as Rabbi Yochanan.

I believe that the only one who holds "yesh em lamikra veyesh em lamesoret" is Rabbi Shimon.

Kol Tuv,
Josh

Comment by David Ben-Abraham on January 27, 2008 at 12:23pm

Rebbe Josh, Shalom.

Without belaboring this point too much, I think I could agree with you that "Al Tikrei" is not necessarily connected to the principle "Yesh em lemiqra veyesh em lemesoreth." I only mentioned the statement in Avod. Zar. 11a because you had first raised the issue of "Kri" and "Ketiv." Yet, if we were to go back to our subject ("Yesh em lemiqra, etc."), it is clear to me that you are wrestling with this issue, when, in actuality, it should be very plain.

You wrote: ["Yesh em le mikra" means that] it is determinant to the *exclusion* of the reverse. If one says "yesh em lamasoret," this is to the exclusion of "yesh em lamikra." If one says "yesh em lamikra" then this is to the exclusion of "yesh em lamasoret."

Again, you have overlooked the teaching in Sanhedrin 4a-b which concludes there that all are in agreement that where one expounds from the principle "Yesh em lemesoreth" (such as when the Rabbis do there over the word "basukkath"), they still acknowledge the principle known as "Yesh em lemiqra." It is the same with Rabbi Akiva in Jerusalem Talmud Hagiga 18b who says that BOTH teachings, "Yitma" and "Yetamei," are derived from the Law, meaning both are equally valid in expounding the particular verse in Leviticus 11:33-34.

It is true, however, that when a teacher makes use of one particular principle of logic (e.g. Yesh em lemiqra), he does so with the intent of bringing to light a certain lesson, and therefore, does not wish to misconstrue the issue by bringing down some other principle of logic (e.g. Yesh em lemesoreth) all in the same breath. Doing so would defeat his purpose, I mean, in the particular lesson that he wishes to bring down.

To simplify matters, it's like saying you can learn two things from one verse - but you should understand from whence each teaching derives its base.

Sincerely,
David

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